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The Meaning of Bush v. Gore
DANIEL H. LOWENSTEIN*
This Article comments on a paper by Edward B. Foley, in which Professor
Foley proposes a taxonomy for analyzing and evaluating actual and
potential challenges to electoral practices under Bush v. Gore. Part 111,
which is the core of the Article, proposes an interpretation of Bush v. Gore
based on a close reading that treats the per curiam opinion as an integrated
explanation of a result, in contrast to interpretations that rely on isolated
statements out of context. The opinion is shown to be coherent. It is not
"limited to its facts" and it does not attempt to negate any precedential
effect, as some scholars have claimed. Two factors are crucial to the
holding: (1) There was a disparate treatment of identical items of evidence
in a judicial proceeding, and (2) the evidence treated inconsistently bore on
the fundamental right to vote. The holding of the case is applicable only
when those factors are present. However, Part IV of the Article proposes a
taxonomy, different from Foley's, for determining Bush v. Gore's possible
influence in cases that are analogous but not within the holding.
I. INTRODUCTION
Edward B. Foley lives and works in Ohio, which this decade has been
the scene of more than its share of lawsuits on election administration. As
Director of Election Law @ Moritz, the election law center located at The
Ohio State University Moritz College of Law, Foley has had an opportunity
surpassed by few others to observe and reflect on recent developments,
including litigation, in election administration. For these and other reasons he
is exceptionally well-situated to expound on the subject denoted in the title of
his article in this Issue, The Future ofBush v. Gore.1
In Foley's ambitious article, following a brief statement of his own
reading of Bush v. Gore,2 he presents a richly textured account of the most
important or representative cases brought in reliance on the Supreme Court's
decision. He uses those cases for a variety of purposes, including, most
prominently, to create a taxonomy of controversies that have arisen, to
present his own analysis of the merits of these controversies and, as his title
implies, to speculate on how Bush v. Gore will affect these and similar
controversies in the near and distant future.
As the reader may have noticed, I have borrowed Foley's title for my
own, but have changed one word: Foley's "Future" becomes my "Meaning."
* Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles. Thanks to Rick Hasen for
useful suggestions, and to the students, staff, and faculty at Election Law @ Moritz for
their hospitality at the Symposium that gave rise to this Article.
1 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 925 (2007).
2 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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I do not deny the interest that predictions have for most people, nor the
practical importance that a correct assessment of the probabilities for the
future development of the law may have for many purposes. Even if I were
inclined to deny that predictions can provide a framework of analysis
yielding important insights into the role of the courts in election
administration, Foley's article would be a conclusive refutation of the denial.
These considerations justify Foley's speculations about the future, if any
justification is needed, but not necessarily a tendency I perceive in his article
to conflate the question of what is likely to happen in the future with the
question of what the law is now.
That such a tendency should exist is not remarkable. All of us live in the
thrall of Holmes's famous saying: "The prophecies of what the courts will do
in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law."'3 But
while it was a striking insight when it was written, Holmes's statement
cannot serve as an acceptable definition of law. Most judges deliberating
over a case would say and believe, and most of the rest of us would want
them to say and believe, that what they are trying to do is apply the law
correctly. It would be meaningless for them to insert Holmes's definition and
say that they are trying to apply to the controversy at hand a correct
prediction of what they will do. To take Holmes's insight as a true account of
law is both incoherent and subversive of the rule of law.4
In this Article, I choose to avoid speculation on what is likely to happen
and concentrate instead on the question of what Bush v. Gore means now.5
Foley has made it much easier to do that by his illuminating collection of the
controversies that have arisen and by his helpful taxonomy. I appreciatively
stand on his shoulders in Part II in order to point out what I conceive to be
some weaknesses in that taxonomy. I do not attempt to replace it with a fully-
worked-out improved version, but I do attempt briefly in Part JV to suggest
some different lines along which the cases might be sorted. I do this
following an effort in Part III to give the per curiam opinion in Bush v. Gore
a closer reading than I believe Foley gives it or than some other scholars
3 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 461
(1897).
4 The same point is made well by Michael C. Dorf, Prediction and the Rule of Law,
42 UCLA L. REv. 651, 657-58 (1995).
5 Of course, there are many senses in which one could speak of the meaning of Bush
v. Gore. For example, in a lecture I gave in Australia, I suggested that the social meaning
of the entire Florida controversy, including Bush v. Gore, is best understood through the
lens of the literary genre of comedy. See Daniel Lowenstein, Lessons from the Florida
Controversy, in REALIZING DEMOCRACY 7, 12-25 (Graeme Orr, Bryan Mercurio &
George Williams, eds., 2002). For present purposes I, like Foley, refer to the practical
meaning of Bush v. Gore as a possible precedent in controversies over election
administration. Or, as one might say, Bush v. Gore as applied.
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have given it. Foley's article is written on the premise that to understand
either the present meaning or the future of Bush v. Gore (for, despite the title,
his article addresses both), one must form a concrete understanding of the
kinds of circumstances in which it ought to be and in fact is likely to be
applied or, at least, invoked. I agree. Hence the value of Foley's rich account
of the controversies that have arisen. A taxonomy consists of a set of
distinctions. At least for the purpose of what Bush v. Gore means now, the
distinctions that make up a good taxonomy must be grounded on a close
reading of the Court's opinion. The purpose of what follows is to contribute
to the formation of a taxonomy so grounded and thereby to contribute to our
understanding of Bush v. Gore as a precedent.
II. FOLEY'S TAXONOMY
A taxonomy is a division of a set of phenomena into categories. By what
criteria should one judge the categories that make up a taxonomy? I shall
consider two criteria: the usefulness of the categories and the clarity with
which the categories divide up the members of the set.6
The usefulness of a taxonomy is in part a function of the degree to which
its categories draw distinctions that are pertinent to the purpose at hand. The
purpose here is to clarify the meaning of Bush v. Gore as applied and, for
Foley, to assist in speculation about the future of Bush v. Gore. Usefulness is
also in part a function of the degree of articulation of the taxonomy. To use a
silly example to illustrate, suppose we proposed to consider the meaning of
Bush v. Gore by dividing all controversies into those in which the plaintiffs
6 A third possible criterion for a taxonomy, not mentioned in the text, is accuracy.
Almost a quarter of a century ago, I had occasion, in a different context, to propose that at
least for legal purposes, categories are formed to be useful, rather than found ready-made
in the real world. See Daniel Hays Lowenstein, California Initiatives and the Single-
Subject Rule, 30 UCLA L. REv. 936 (1983). As I discussed briefly in that article, in
biology, chemistry, and other studies of natural phenomena, the real world is divided into
naturally distinct classes of phenomena, sometimes referred to as "natural kinds"-or so
some philosophers maintain. Id. at 939 n.17. Whatever else may be said about
controversies arising under Bush v. Gore, they are not naturally divided into distinct types
in the way living species or chemical elements are. Therefore, we have no occasion to
enter into philosophical or other questions related to natural kinds. However, it would be
possible to think of the usefulness criterion as one of accuracy. For my purpose, a useful
taxonomy is one based on distinctions most relevant to a correct reading of Bush v. Gore.
For Foley's additional purpose, a useful taxonomy is one that is relevant to predicted
future applications of Bush v. Gore. Such distinctions could be thought of as useful
precisely because they are accurate. But in that case, accuracy is not a third criterion but
merely a different way of characterizing the criterion that I refer to as usefulness.
Beneath the surface of this rather superficial footnote lurks the old controversy
between realism and nominalism. Readers who applaud nothing else in this Article will
no doubt welcome my choice not to enter into that controversy.
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rely on the Equal Protection Clause and those in which they do not. That
categorization is certainly relevant to Bush v. Gore, whose ruling is expressly
based on the Equal Protection Clause.7 But the categorization is silly because
its degree of articulation is grossly insufficient. Most cases brought under the
Equal Protection Clause have nothing to do with Bush v. Gore. Worse yet,
the category does nothing to distinguish among those controversies to which
Bush v. Gore might plausibly be regarded as pertinent. 8 I shall defer
discussion of the usefulness criterion to Part IV, following the interpretation
of Bush v. Gore offered in Part III.
By the clarity of the taxonomy, I mean the extent to which the definition
and description of each category is sufficient for placement of any member
of the set into the proper category. A perfectly clear taxonomy would contain
divisions so precise that a member of the set could not fit within more than
one category and so comprehensive that every member of the set would fit
into a category. In mathematics and the natural sciences, it is often possible
for taxonomies to be perfectly or almost perfectly clear. In the messier world
of human affairs, we should not expect perfection. Nevertheless, clarity
provides a comparative criterion in the event that one proposed taxonomy is
substantially clearer than another.
As has already been intimated, one of the strengths of Foley's article is
that it starts from the ground up. Instead of abstractly theorizing his way to a
taxonomy, Foley canvasses the controversies that have arisen and builds his
taxonomy around them. Given that a perfectly or nearly perfectly clear
taxonomy is unlikely, it is a strong benefit if the taxonomy works best at
sorting out actual and foreseeable cases, even if the classification of
imaginable but unlikely cases is less clear. Therefore, I do not criticize the
comprehensiveness of Foley's taxonomy, which is structured around actual
and foreseeable cases. Let us consider, instead, the precision of the
boundaries between his categories.
Foley's taxonomy consists of four categories. 9 They are listed below,
with examples of election administration practices that can give rise to
constitutional controversies under each heading:
1. Insufficiently specified standards.' 0
a. Different counties interpret differently a state directive on the
eligibility of provisional ballots to be counted.11 The difference
7 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 103 (2000) (per curiam).
8 A taxonomy might also be deficient in the opposite way by being too fine-grained.
This would be the case if the taxonomy irrelevantly divided many categories into
subcategories that were identical for the purpose at hand.
9 See Foley, supra note 1, at 932-45.
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may be an either/or, such as whether a search of the database for
the voter's registration is sufficient or it is necessary also to
check the original records.' 2 Or it may arise from the exercise of
judgment, such as how closely the handwriting on the
provisional envelope must match the signature on the registration
form. 13
b. In the setting of a "court-ordered statewide recount," some
counties search only the database for a provisional voter's
registration but others go further and check the original
records. 14
c. Different counties interpret differently a state directive for what
form of voter identification is sufficient.' 5
2. Failure to Follow Specified Standards. 16
a. Some counties count provisional ballots cast in the wrong
precinct notwithstanding state directives, upheld by judicial
decisions, to the contrary.' 7
b. When voters go to the wrong precinct, some poll workers refrain
from advising them that they need to go to the correct precinct in
order for their provisional ballots to be counted, despite state or
county directives requiring them to give this advice. 18
c. Local officials require photo identification when state law
permits other forms of identification. 19
10 Id. at 933.
11 See id.
12 See id. at 934.
13 Id. at 935.
14 Id. at 934.
15 See Foley, supra note 1, at 937.
16 Id.
17 See id. at 938.
18 Id. at 938-39.
19 Id. at 939.
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3. Specific State-Authorized Local Discretion.20
a. Counties, as authorized by state law, use different types of voting
equipment with the result that there are more lost votes in some
counties than others. 21
b. A county is authorized to use an innovative system for checking
voters' registration at the polling places, but it works badly,
resulting in serious delays in voting in that county that do not
occur in other counties. 22
c. Allocation of voting equipment to precincts is delegated to the
counties, but some counties make "thickheaded choices,"
resulting in long delays in some precincts. 23
4. Local Variations by Central Design.24
a. The central authority assigns the same number of voting
machines to each precinct despite differences in turnout or other
differences that result in longer delays in some precincts than in
others. 25
b. The county election board decides how many provisional ballots
to provide to different precincts on the basis of "irresponsible
assumptions," resulting in voters in some precincts not being
able to cast provisional ballots.26
A Bush v. Gore claim is an Equal Protection claim, the gravamen of
which consists in a governmental action resulting in a difference of
treatment. The basis of categorization in Foley's taxonomy is the relation
between the central and local authority that results in the different treatment.
In the case of the second category-failure by the local authority to follow
the central authority's specified standards-the lines of demarcation are
clear. True, there could be borderline cases in which it is debatable whether a
local practice actually contravenes a central directive. But such cases create
no doubt about the conceptual boundaries of the second category, and the
practical difficulty will be resolved once the central directive is interpreted.
2 0 Id. at 940.
21 Foley, supra note 1, at 940-41.
2 2 Id. at 942.
23 Id. at 943.
24 Id. at 944.
25 Id.
2 6 I. at 945.
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So far, so good. But the boundaries separating the three remaining
categories are much less clear. In none of these cases is the local authority
disobeying central requirements. In the first category, the central directive is
vague or ambiguous, creating the possibility or likelihood that local practice
will vary. In the third category, the central directive expressly gives
discretion to the local authorities, creating the possibility or likelihood that
local practice will vary. In the fourth category, the central authority itself
directs varying practices.
So stated, there do appear to be clear conceptual differences between the
three categories. In practice, however, the differences break down. Consider
the line between the first and third categories. Suppose the central authority
in one state directs that "voters seeking to cast provisional ballots shall
provide such documents establishing their identities as the county registrar
determines are sufficient." If different counties require different documents,
the case comes under Foley's third category, as the central authority has
expressly delegated to the counties the authority to decide which documents
will suffice. Suppose the central authority in another state directs that "voters
seeking to cast a provisional ballot shall provide documents sufficient to
establish their identities." Here there is no express delegation to the counties.
If different counties require different documents, should we place this case
under the first category, on the ground that the standard of sufficiency is
insufficiently specified? Perhaps so, but in practice there is no difference
between the directives in the two states. What if, as is very likely, those who
formulated the central directive understood and intended that its effect would
be to place discretion to determine sufficiency in the counties? Should the
two states still be placed into different categories-meaning, on Foley's
account, that the practice is much more likely to be struck down under Bush
v. Gore in the first state than in the second-simply because of a difference
in language reflecting no difference in either effect or intent? If not, and
instead both states are placed in the third category, then the line between the
first and the third category turns on whether the vesting of discretion in the
local authority was purposeful or inadvertent. That will be a very difficult
distinction to draw in actual cases, in part because it requires an inquiry into
the state of mind of the central authority and in part because the distinction is
actually one of degree, not an either/or. Even the most detailed directive will
foreseeably fail to resolve some borderline cases, and even the most general
directive will provide some guidance.
In the abstract, the distinction between the third and fourth categories
may seem clearer, but as Foley develops the categories, that distinction is at
least as troublesome as the distinction between the first and third. It would be
logically possible for state authorities to require some counties to follow one
practice-adoption of a particular form of voting equipment, for example-
and to require other counties to follow a different practice, with the result
20071 1013
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that many voters are not able to vote or have their votes counted in one set of
counties who would be able to in the other counties. Foley would probably
regard such a case as giving rise to a strong Bush v. Gore claim, at least if
there were no differences between the counties justifying the different
requirements. But he does not discuss such cases for the good reason that he
grounds his article in practicality, and such a situation is relatively unlikely to
arise. Typically, the state either mandates a uniform electoral practice or
leaves it up to the counties.
Therefore, the examples Foley gives under his fourth category do not
involve the state authorities at all. In these examples the county is the central
authority and the different treatment arises because the county treats some
precincts differently from others-or, as in example 4.a. above, it produces
different effects by treating different precincts as if they were the same. It
appears, then, that the only difference between the fourth category and the
first and third categories is that for purposes of the fourth, Foley is covering
up part of the organization chart. The only reason the county can lawfully
treat different precincts differently is that the state has expressly (third
category) or implicitly (first category) left the matter up to the county.27 The
arbitrariness of the division between the third and fourth categories can be
seen in a comparison of examples 3.c. and 4.b. The subject of 3.c. is the
number of voting machines allocated to each precinct and in 4.b. it is the
number of provisional ballots, but surely that difference is neither here nor
there. Example 3.c. could just as well be about the allocation of provisional
ballots and 4.b. about the allocation of voting machines. Nor can the
difference be that one mistake was caused by "thickheaded choices" 28 and
the other by "irresponsible assumptions." 29 For any relevant purpose the
examples are identical. Foley has duplicated the example, in one case using it
as an illustration of the third category and in the other as an illustration of the
fourth category. His having done so illustrates that his taxonomy is less clear
than it might be.
One reason for this is that although Foley has chosen to divide his
categories along the lines of relations between central and local authority, he
does not explain why that should be the basis for the taxonomy. Without
such an explanation it becomes difficult to know, for example, whether and
why it makes a difference that the discretion placed in local officials results
from an express state decision to grant such discretion or an inadvertent state
failure to provide sufficient standards.
27 For ease of exposition and to prevent a possible proliferation of detailed analysis,
I assume throughout this Article that the elections in question are statewide elections.
28 Foley, supra note 1, at 943.
29 Id. at 945.
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Foley may have organized his categories by central-local relations
because he believes they provide the dimension that divides Bush v. Gore
claims as more or less likely to succeed. Whether or not that was the basis for
organizing his taxonomy, he certainly believes that the taxonomy provides
that dimension. Although not unequivocally, Foley apparently believes his
four categories are ranked in order from those in which the Bush v. Gore
claims are most likely to succeed (first category) to those in which they are
least likely to succeed (fourth category).30 So far as we are discussing the
meaning of Bush v. Gore as opposed to predicting the results of future cases,
my analysis in Part III will make clear why I think this is doubtful. But to the
extent that the categories in his taxonomy are unclear, the taxonomy will
necessarily be of limited use for ascertaining either the meaning or the future
of Bush v. Gore.
One more point about Foley's taxonomy will provide a transition to
Part II. Among the examples given in the above outline of Foley's
taxonomy, one item, 1.b., stands separate from the others. In all his other
examples, different treatment of votes or voters arises from administrative or,
possibly, legislative decisions (because the state directive may appear in
either a statute or an administrative mandate). In Example 1 .b., the difference
arises because it is ordered or permitted by a court that is adjudicating a
contest of an election. 3 1 Not coincidentally, this is the only example that does
not appear in the section of Foley's article headed: "A Taxonomy of
Potential Bush v. Gore Claims." Rather, it appears later when Foley is
arguing for what he sees as "the strongest possible" claim that could be made
under Bush v. Gore. That claim, according to Foley, would arise as a result of
30 See id. at 933-945.
31 Though I quoted Foley accurately in Example l.b., here I slightly but significantly
altered what Foley actually says. In his description of I .b., he refers to a "court-ordered
statewide recount" (emphasis added). I refer here and throughout this Article to court-
conducted recounts. A question could arise under state law whether a recount ought to
occur, with no issue of how it ought to be conducted. If the administrative officials
conclude there should be no recount, but a court overrules them, there would be a court-
ordered recount. That is roughly what happened in the first round of the 2000 election
litigation in the Florida Supreme Court. See, e.g., Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v.
Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. 2000). The United States Supreme Court never intimated
that the proceedings at that stage raised any Equal Protection problems. There is no
reason why the constitutional standards applicable to a court-ordered recount should be
any different than for a recount conducted in the normal course without judicial
intervention. In the second round of the Florida litigation, the Democrats initiated what in
Florida law was called a contest of the election. This was a judicial proceeding,
amounting in practice to a judicially-conducted recount, as opposed to the first round,
which eventuated in judicially-ordered recounts. It is true that in the Florida election
contest the actual work of counting ballots was conducted by county officials, but they
were acting as agents of the court.
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some provisional ballots not being counted because the county official does
not check registration records beyond a computerized database, whereas they
would be counted in other counties in which the officials check the original
records.32 Foley then acknowledges the objection that Bush v. Gore might be
distinguishable from his "strongest possible" case because the former, unlike
Foley's hypothetical, arose in the setting of a judicially conducted election
contest. In response to that objection Foley says that the hypothesized Bush
v. Gore claim could just as easily be restated to arise in a judicially
conducted contest, in the course of which one side challenges the failure to
count the provisional ballots in counties in which the original records were
not checked. When the facts are so restated, Bush v. Gore becomes
indistinguishable.
Just so. But for one who believes the placing of the dispute into the
setting of a judicially conducted contest makes all the difference and, on that
basis, accepts Foley's rebuttal to the objection, but who accepts his rebuttal
only for the purpose of the revised hypothetical, not the original one-and
now I shall tip my hand and confess that I am such a one-Foley has slipped
a crucial distinction into the midst of one of his categories. If a taxonomy of
controversies is to be helpful in explicating the meaning of Bush v. Gore, the
crucial distinctions should mark the dividing lines between the categories,
not be buried within the categories.
We shall return, in Part IV, to some discussion of where the taxonomical
lines might be drawn. Now we are ready to turn to the per curiam opinion in
Bush v. Gore.
III. A CLOSE READING OF BUSH v. GORE
Many scholars have interpreted Bush v. Gore as a sort of Janus, with one
face smiling expansively toward an Equal Protection doctrine that
encourages judicial supervision of all aspects of election administration, but
the other face glowering at any who might dare to invoke the decision as a
precedent for any purpose. Most such scholars prefer the decision's
expansive face, which they find embodied in the general recitation of broad
Equal Protection principles early in the decision. But they acknowledge the
existence of "limiting language" that may lead others to believe the case is
not a precedent at all. 33
32 Foley, supra note 1, at 955.
33 Foley, who favors the expansive view, caricatures the narrow view by
hypothesizing a lower-court declaration that Bush v. Gore "was unprincipled, applicable
solely to its.., chad-based facts, and never to be relied [on] to sustain the merits of any
other Equal Protection case." Foley, supra note 1, at 985. See also Steven J. Mulroy,
Lemonade from Lemons: Can Advocates Convert Bush v. Gore Into a Vehicle for
Reform?, 9 GEO. J. ON PovERTY L. & POL'Y 357 (2002) (providing a thoughtful example
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The supposedly limiting language usually cited is this sentence: "Our
consideration is limited to the present circumstances, for the problem of
equal protection in election processes generally presents many
complexities. '" 34 Foley and others believe that sentence is "unprincipled" 35
and that by inserting it the Court "expressly denied the case had any
precedential value." 36 Interpreters of Bush v. Gore, then, must choose
between the unprincipled face represented by the language just quoted and
the decision's brighter and presumably more principled side, which entails
much more sweeping consequences such as, in Justice Breyer's words,
"invalidat[ing] any state provision for a manual recount of individual
counties in a statewide election." 37 Or, in the words of Richard Hasen, the
bright side of Bush v. Gore would "have great precedential value in changing
a host of voting procedures and mechanisms." 38
The Janus interpretation of Bush v. Gore depends on treating passages
from the per curiam decision in isolation. At best, the interpreter juxtaposes
the supposedly conflicting passages and seeks to reconcile them, as if they
were different sections of a statute to be interpreted in pari materia. A better
approach is to consider the per curiam opinion as a whole, with individual
passages evaluated not in isolation or even in juxtaposition with other
passages, but as parts of an explanation of the result. That is the approach I
propose to take in this Part. Of course, there are undoubtedly some judicial
opinions whose reasoning is so deficient that the parts cannot be reconciled
into an integrated whole. Although I do not claim that the per curiam opinion
in Bush v. Gore is especially well-written or well-reasoned, I shall attempt to
show that the Janus interpretation greatly exaggerates the opinion's
deficiencies.
As intimated in Part 1I, Bush v. Gore interprets the Equal Protection
Clause to require that in a judicially conducted recount or contest of a public
election, identical items of evidence, namely ballots, must be given equal
treatment. Foley and others acknowledge that one face of the decision
interprets the Equal Protection Clause in this manner, though for rhetorical
of the Janus-type interpretation of Bush v. Gore.); Cass R. Sunstein, The Equal Chance to
Have One's Vote Count, 21 LAW AND PHILOSOPHY 121 (2002) (also seeking in Mulroy's
terminology, to derive lemonade from lemons in Bush v. Gore). However, Sunstein's
thoughtful analysis eschews the Janus-type interpretation by defending the so-called
limiting language. See infra notes 59 and 65 for criticism of Sunstein's reading.
34 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000) (per curiam).
35 Foley, supra note 1, at 932.
36 Richard L. Hasen, Bush v. Gore and the Future of Equal Protection Law in
Elections, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 377, 387 (2001) (emphasis in original).
37 Bush, 531 U.S. at 145 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
38 Hasen, supra note 36, at 379.
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purposes they often mischaracterize the holding as being limited to its own
facts and by design having no precedential effect whatever. 39 I begin with the
proposition that it would not be within the power of the Court to limit this
decision or any other to "its facts" or to deny a decision any precedential
effect, even if its members asserted they intended to do so.40 The
precedential force of a decision comes from the ruling of the Court and from
the opinion insofar as it explains the reasons for the ruling. An assertion in an
opinion that the decision is not to be regarded as a precedent is not an
explanation of the ruling and therefore it is a dictum, having no binding
force. True, a dictum is worthy of respect to the extent that it is persuasive,
just as any other persuasive commentary on a legal question is worthy of
respect. But a statement by the Court that its decision should not have
precedential effect would not be persuasive, because it would be contrary to
the judicial method that prevails in the United States and other common law
countries. One of the underpinnings of that method is the principle that like
cases should be decided alike. For these reasons, if the per curiam decision in
fact did say or suggest that the case should be "limited to its facts," or
anything to that effect, the critics would be right to criticize it as
unprincipled.41
A dictum may also be useful for one trying to predict what the Court will
do in the future, if it is assumed that the dictum accurately represents the
thinking of one or more members of the Court and if those members are still
39 According to Hasen, the Court's language "explicitly limit[ed] its holding to the
facts of this case." Hasen, supra note 36, at 386. Hasen's language saying that the Court
expressly denied the decision's precedential value has already been quoted. See
supra,note 36 and accompanying text.
40 Limiting a decision to its facts and denying it any precedential effect appear to be
equivalent statements when they are used by critics of Bush v. Gore. To say that a
decision is to be limited to its facts could mean it is limited to facts that are relevant to the
holding. But that interpretation would give the statement no effect, because the holding of
a decision is always limited to the circumstances that determine the result. If "the facts"
to which the case is limited are specified, then the specification may be part of the
explanation of the ruling. But if the facts to which the case is limited are all the facts,
including the names of the parties, the exact events that occurred, the exact time at which
they occurred, and so on, then the statement is the same as a statement that the decision
has no precedential effect. That is what proponents of the Janus interpretation of Bush v.
Gore mean when they attribute to the Court the assertion that the case is to be limited to
its facts, and it is in that sense that I claim such an assertion, if the Court had made it,
would have been a dictum that could and ought to be ignored. See generally Chad
Flanders, Comment, Bush v. Gore and the Uses of "Limiting," 116 YALE L.J. 1159
(2007).
41 See Flanders, supra note 40, at 1167 ("If the Court must give reasons for its
decisions, it is unclear whether it should have the power to make those reasons non-
general, i.e., to limit their application beyond one set of facts."). Flanders' law journalese
term, "it is unclear whether it should," translated into English, means "it should not."
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on the Court when a case arises to which the dictum is relevant. The purpose
here is not to predict what the Court will do in the future, but what the law is
now, and for that purpose a dictum denying precedential effect would be
irrelevant.
In fact, the Court made no such assertion in Bush v. Gore. The sentence
previously quoted does not appear in isolation. It appears in the following
paragraph:
The [Florida] recount process, in its features here described, is
inconsistent with the minimum procedures necessary to protect the
fundamental right of each voter in the special instance of a statewide
recount under the authority of a single state judicial officer. Our
consideration is limited to the present circumstances, for the problem of
equal protection in election processes generally presents many
complexities. 42
The second sentence of this concluding paragraph is not a forward-
looking statement of how the decision should be employed as a precedent (in
which case it would be a dictum), but an explanation of how the problem
before the Court is best defined. The natural interpretation of "present
circumstances" is not the infinite number of facts in the particular case that
could never be exactly repeated, but the circumstances specified in the
previous sentence, namely, "the special instance of a statewide recount under
the authority of a single state judicial officer. '43 That is not an unreasonable
definition of the problem presented. It is certainly not a definition artificially
contrived to assure that no future case could possibly come within its rubric.
Most of the deficiencies itemized by the Court in what the Florida Supreme
Court had ordered involved disparate treatment in a court proceeding of
substantially identical items of evidence. For example, this was true of
identically marked ballots counted differently because of inconsistent intra-
county or inter-county standards.44 It was also (and, in my judgment, most
42 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000). Henceforth, for identification, I shall refer
to the quoted passage as the "concluding paragraph"--not because it comes at the end of
the opinion, which it does not, but because it is the place in the opinion where the Court
draws the conclusion that follows from the major and minor premises set forth in the
opinion.
43 Flanders relies on the second sentence of the concluding paragraph without ever
so much as acknowledging the existence of the first sentence. See Flanders, supra note
40, at 1159. This is a good example-not even an extreme or unusual example-of the
understanding of judicial decisions based on extraction of isolated passages.
44 The question, the Court noted, was "how to interpret the marks or holes or
scratches on an inanimate object, a piece of cardboard or paper which, it is said, might
not have registered as a vote during the machine count. The factfinder confronts a thing,
not a person." Bush, 531 U.S. at 106.
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seriously) true of different processes used for determination of which
physical evidence to examine in different counties. For most of the counties,
the Florida court ordered that "undervote" ballots be identified and manually
counted. But not in the counties that had already conducted recounts of some
or all of the ballots. In those counties, the Florida Supreme Court proposed to
rely on the recounts that had previously been conducted, despite the fact that
the identity of the ballots to be recounted and the method of recounting
differed entirely from the new recounting that was called for in the rest of the
state.
That identical items of evidence should be evaluated identically in a
single court proceeding would appear to be required by natural and obvious
principles of justice. Indeed, as Roy Schotland has suggested, the Court
might well have based its decision on the Due Process Clause. 45 The Court
concluded instead that the disparate treatment of identical items of
evidence-when those items represented ballots cast by individuals-
constituted a denial of the Equal Protection Clause. The Court was surely
correct to point out that it was unnecessary, in order to reach that conclusion,
to consider controversies that would be presented if plaintiffs challenged
other kinds of disparities resulting from "election processes generally."46
It thus appears that the stronger versions of the Janus interpretation, in
which one face of the decision purports to nullify Bush v. Gore's precedential
effect, have no basis. But there is a weaker version of the Janus interpretation
that must be taken more seriously. Indeed, when the proponents of the Janus
interpretation, who are astute lawyers, state it in its strong form it is more
likely they are engaging in hyperbole than that they are actually misreading
the paragraph just quoted.47 The reason for the hyperbole is that the
45 Roy A. Schotland, In Bush v. Gore: Whatever Happened to the Due Process
Ground?, 34 LOY. U. CHi. L.J. 211, 212 (2002). Due process of law is required as a
precondition of deprivation of life, liberty, or property. Schotland makes the plausible but
perhaps not compelling argument that the right to vote is a liberty interest within the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 231. If that argument is accepted, then the
contention that the Florida Supreme Court's conduct of the election contest was a denial
of due process seems to me irresistible. Perhaps the Court itself thought so. Although
initially the Court summarizes its conclusion as finding a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause, Bush, 531 U.S. at 103 (per curiam), later it notes a failure of the
recount to be conducted "in compliance with the requirements of equal protection and
due process." Id. at 110.
46 Bush, 531 U.S. at 109 (per curiam).
47 As we have seen, Hasen claims, incorrectly, that the Court explicitly limited its
holding to the facts of the case and expressly denied that the decision should have any
precedential effect. Hasen, supra note 36, at 387. However, he also says "it is hard to
imagine many cases falling into [the] category" of failure to give equal treatment in a
statewide election contest. Id. To say that there will not be many cases for which Bush v.
Gore will have precedential effect is quite different from saying it is limited to its facts or
1020 [Vol. 68:1007
MEANING OF BUSH V GORE
commentators believe that a decision in Bush v. Gore based on Equal
Protection ought to mean that various disparities in election administration,
such as all or many of the examples discussed by Foley, are unconstitutional.
From their perspective, a holding applicable only to election contests or
recounts in statewide court proceedings is negligible. It is therefore
understandable that they slide into language ignoring the holding altogether.
The weaker and more plausible version of the Janus interpretation is that,
although the passage we have been discussing suggests a precedential
meaning that is real but unlikely to arise often, other language in the opinion
suggests a more expansive practical meaning.48 To assess that version, we
must look at the opinion as a whole.
The opening sentences of the per curiam opinion emphasize the Florida
Supreme Court's inconsistent evidentiary treatment of different ballots:
On December 8, 2000, the Supreme Court of Florida ordered that the
Circuit Court of Leon County tabulate by hand 9,000 ballots in Miami-Dade
County. It also ordered the inclusion in the certified vote totals of 215 votes
identified in Palm Beach County and 168 votes identified in Miami-Dade
County for [the Democratic candidates].... The court further held that
relief would require manual recounts in all Florida counties where so-called
"undervotes" had not been subject to manual tabulation.49
According to Foley, the "key fact for Equal Protection purposes in Bush
v. Gore was that some dimpled chads were counted while others were not." 50
It is true that popular debate during the Florida controversy centered on the
inconsistent treatment of chads, but there is only slight basis in the per
curiam opinion for Foley's imputing this focus to the Court. The Court leads
not with standards for appraising individual ballots but with the troubling fact
that under the Florida court's supervision, the count in some counties would
reflect a manual recount of all the ballots but in most counties a recount of
only a small selection of the ballots.
that the per curiam opinion expressly denied that the case has any precedential effect. The
latter, as I have shown, would attempt what is beyond the power of the Court. The former
is a natural consequence of the unusual action of the Florida Supreme Court.
48 Henceforth, when I refer to the Janus interpretation, I am referring to this weaker
version.
49 531 U.S. at 100.
50 Foley, supra note 1, at 930. Foley acknowledges that the Court identified other
Equal Protection problems but claims "there is no doubt" that the inconsistent standards
for appraising dimpled and punctured chads were sufficient for an equal protection
violation. Id at 931. It is not clear whether Foley is implying that the other Equal
Protection problems mentioned by the Court, singly or in the aggregate, would have been
insufficient without the inconsistent appraisal of chads.
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The Court continues to present the facts and background of the
controversy in some detail and, at the end of this portion of the opinion,
describes the controversy in the following terms: "The petition presents the
following questions: ... whether the use of standardless manual recounts
violates the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses."'51
We are particularly concerned with whether and to what extent language
in the opinion detracts from the apparently clear statement in the concluding
paragraph, which suggests that the decision is based particularly on the
inconsistencies having occurred in "a statewide recount under the authority
of a single state judicial officer." The language quoted in the previous
paragraph comes at an important place in the opinion-the Court's first
statement of the question before it-and it must be conceded that it can be
read to support the Janus interpretation. The reference is to recounts, not only
to recounts conducted by a court. However, the comfort provided to Janus
proponents is not very great. Although the reference is simply to recounts, it
follows a lengthy description of the particular recount in question, which of
course occurred in the setting of an election contest ordered by the Florida
Supreme Court and conducted, until interrupted, by the Circuit Court of Leon
County.52 Words take their meaning from the context in which they are
uttered. Although the words appearing in the question as formulated by the
Court may seem, in isolation, to refer to any recount, the context permits if it
does not require a more limited meaning.
There follows a short section of only two paragraphs in which the Court
describes the problems with punchcard voting systems that came to light
during the controversy and predicts that legislatures are likely to consider
possible improvements. 53 The speculation on likely legislative solutions is in
tension with the contention, required for a Janus interpretation of Bush v.
Gore, that the early portion of the opinion implies that the existence of such
51 531 U.S. at 103. I have omitted the first question, which the Court did not reach.
The use of the phrase "standardless manual recounts" could perhaps be thought to
support Foley's contention that the key issue for the court was the lack of standards for
appraising chads. However, coming as this paragraph does at the end of a lengthy
description of a variety of inconsistencies in the Florida court's treatment of evidence,
"standardless manual recounts" is better understood as referring to the entire range of
problems.
52 The Florida proceedings consisted of two stages, the first a "recount" conducted
administratively in some counties, the second a "contest," which was a judicial
proceeding. It is perhaps significant that there is nothing in the Bush v. Gore per curiam
opinion casting any constitutional doubt on the first stage of the proceedings. If the
definition of the controversy did not depend crucially on the setting of a judicial
proceeding, then one would expect the Court to have included the many disparities in the
recount stage in the list of constitutional difficulties.
53 531 U.S. at 103-04.
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problems "in election processes generally" is unconstitutional. It is unusual
for the Court to predict and impliedly recommend legislative reform. What
would have been the reason to do it if the Justices saw themselves as jumping
into the area?54 Nevertheless, any implication in this section of the opinion is
too indirect to bear much weight.
The heart of Bush v. Gore is in section II.B., which makes up the
remainder of the opinion except for a brief conclusion. The Court begins by
observing that the Constitution leaves it up to the legislature of a state to
decide whether the presidential electors for that state are to be chosen by
popular vote.55 Janus interpreters might find some support in this sentence:
When the state legislature vests the right to vote for President in its people,
the right to vote as the legislature has prescribed is fundamental; and one
source of its fundamental nature lies in the equal weight accorded to each
vote and the equal dignity owed to each voter.56
But it is primarily the next paragraph on which the Janus interpreters
rely. To be sure their interpretation receives its due, let us consider the
passage in full:
The right to vote is protected in more than the initial allocation of the
franchise. Equal protection applies as well to the manner of its exercise.
Having once granted the right to vote on equal terms, the State may not, by
later arbitrary and disparate treatment, value one person's vote over that of
another. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665
(1966) ("[O]nce the franchise is granted to the electorate, lines may not be
drawn which are inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment"). It must be remembered that "the right of suffrage
can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen's vote
just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the
franchise." Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964). 57
Our question is, how do the foregoing two passages affect the meaning
of the opinion, by which I mean the explanation the Court gives for its ruling.
At first blush, it appears that the passages cannot affect the meaning of the
opinion in any significant way, because they contain nothing new. In the first
quotation the Court states the premise that voting is a fundamental right for
Equal Protection purposes, a premise that had been well established for
54 For reasons that will be made clear later, I do not regard the question of what the
Justices actually thought as having any significance in itself for the meaning of Bush v.
Gore. But proper interpretation of written language requires effort to discern the intent
that the language itself seems to reflect.
55 531 U.S. at 104.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 104-05.
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decades.58 The remaining principles, as the Court indicates, are from Harper
and Reynolds. Plaintiffs in any of the kinds of cases described by Foley are of
course free to cite Bush v. Gore for these principles, but they are no better off
for doing so than if they relied on the original cases for the same principles.
The Janus interpreters will make a more subtle argument. Their point
will be that the enunciation of these principles in the setting of Bush v. Gore
means that the principles are relevant to recounts and by extension, perhaps,
to other cases of the type Foley describes. That is, the fact that the principles
were enunciated suggests that they were relevant to the decision.59 This logic
is not necessarily correct--dicta do appear in judicial opinions, after all-but
we should regard it as presumptively correct rather than presuming that the
opinion set forth such principles for no reason.60
The next step of the argument is where the Janus interpretation stands or
falls. That interpretation depends on showing that these broad principles
could play no explanatory role if the Court's reasoning were indeed based on
the fact that it was dealing with the "special instance of a statewide recount
under the authority of a single state judicial officer" rather than with
"election processes generally." Perhaps any inconsistent treatment of
evidence in a judicial proceeding such as occurred in Florida would violate
the Equal Protection Clause. In that case, if the recitation of the broad
principles of Harper and Reynolds are relevant to the decision as we are
presuming, it would have to be because any inconsistent treatment of
ballots-and by extension, perhaps, any inconsistent treatment of voters-
even in settings other than judicial proceedings, comes within the rationale of
the opinion. If that reasoning were sound, then the recitation of the broad
principles would be in tension with the later explanation based on the fact
that Bush v. Gore arose from a single judicial proceeding. The existence of
such tension is exactly what the Janus interpreters assert.
58 See Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
59 Sunstein characterizes these principles as not only relevant to the opinion but as
expressing the Court's "fundamental motivation." See Sunstein, supra note 33, at 123.
His phrase is not only obscure but a curious one for him to use, since he disavows, twice,
the claim that the Justices who made up the majority were motivated by the argument he
puts forth. Id. at 121, 128. It is hard to see in what sense the Court can have a
"fundamental motivation" that is not shared by the Justices. The infelicitous phrase aside,
Sunstein's entire reading of the per curiam opinion follows from the undefended premise
that the general principles enunciated are the only significant principles necessary for the
result. I believe my analysis in this Part demonstrates that Sunstein's premise is
erroneous. See infra note 65.
60 In my judgment, the contemporary Court is overly prone to inflating the
principles at stake in many cases it decides. There is a cost to that practice, in clarity and
precision. However, our purpose here is not criticism of the Court but exegesis, and
proper exegesis requires at least a mild presumption that each conspicuous part of the
opinion is part of the explanation for the decision.
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The fallacy in the reasoning lies in the premise that it is irrelevant that
the evidence being treated inconsistently consists of ballots cast in a public
election, because any similarly inconsistent treatment of evidence in any type
of judicial proceeding must necessarily violate the Equal Protection Clause.
The Janus interpretation rests on the assumption that the inconsistent
treatment of identical evidence in a single judicial proceeding is sufficient for
an Equal Protection violation under the holding of Bush v. Gore. In that case,
the recitation of the fundamental nature of the right to vote is either
gratuitous or must point to an independently sufficient ground for the
decision. But there is nothing in the per curiam opinion that supports the
premise that inconsistent treatment of identical evidence in a judicial
proceeding is in itself sufficient for a violation. To the contrary, the only time
the "special instance" of a proceeding under "a single state judicial officer" is
mentioned is in the concluding paragraph, where it is linked with "the
fundamental right of each voter." The concluding paragraph is explicit that
the "present circumstances" that entail an Equal Protection violation are
circumstances in which the right to vote is at stake in a single judicial
proceeding. Each of these circumstances is necessary for the violation and
neither, by itself, is sufficient.
Suppose, for example, a controversy arises over the counting of votes in
a proxy contest for the election of directors of a corporation and that in
adjudicating the controversy, a state court commits inconsistencies
comparable to those that occurred in Florida. The court delegates the
counting of proxy ballots to different teams, knowing that they are applying
inconsistent standards. The court grandfathers in recounts of some blocs of
ballots conducted on an entirely different basis from the ballots that will be
recounted by the court. And so on. The losing side brings the controversy to
a federal court, claiming a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Would
Bush v. Gore be controlling? No, precisely because of the recitation of the
broad electoral principles we are considering. Because of that recitation, a
disparity in the treatment of public ballots in a judicial proceeding cannot be
equated with disparity in treatment of corporate proxy ballots or any other
identical items of evidence not involving votes in a public election. This is
not to say that the plaintiff would necessarily lose in the corporate case, only
that Bush v. Gore would not dictate the result. The fact that Bush v. Gore
would not be controlling demonstrates that the statement of broad principles
in the per curiam opinion serves as part of the explanation of why the
election contest conducted by the Florida Supreme Court was
unconstitutional. There is thus no tension between the statement of broad
principles and the explanation of the holding as determined by the "special
instance" of a recount within a single judicial proceeding. The argument for
the Janus interpretation thus dissolves.
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Following the paragraph in which the Harper and Reynolds principles
are laid out, the Court notes that-not surprisingly-the parties agree on
these "basic propositions."' 61 The question to be decided is "whether the
recount procedures the Florida Supreme Court has adopted are consistent
with its obligation to avoid arbitrary and disparate treatment of the members
of its electorate. ' 62 Although hardly decisive, this statement of the question
supports the interpretation that Bush v. Gore has but one face, that the
question it decides is the applicability of the Equal Protection Clause to
judicially conducted recounts. For this question marks the transition from
discussion of some of the principles that govern the case to the specifics of
the case that must be adjudged by those principles. The question is not
whether the recount procedures in the abstract are constitutional, but whether
the procedures adopted by the Florida Supreme Court are constitutional.
From this point in the per curiam opinion to the concluding paragraph,
the Court describes and analyzes the particular disparities that marred the
Florida Supreme Court's proceeding. 63 This portion of the opinion can be
thought of as establishing the minor premise of the syllogism, that the
particular practices being challenged violate the principles that constitute the
holding of the case. It is not necessary for present purposes to consider these
pages in detail.64
What then, is the major premise, or the holding of the case? The answer
emerges clearly from the foregoing analysis. The major premise is that when
a recount for a public election is conducted in a single judicial proceeding,
then any avoidable disparate treatment of identical ballots is-presumptively,
at least-a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. I said above that the per
curiam opinion is not especially well-written or well-reasoned. The main
reason is that one element of the major premise, the setting of a judicially
conducted recount, is suggested here and there but is not clearly stated as part
of the major premise until the concluding paragraph. That failing
undoubtedly accounts for much of the confusion that Bush v. Gore has
created.65
61 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 105 (2000).
62 Id.
63 Id. at 105-09.
64 If a case arises in which the procedures employed by a court conducting a recount
are not exactly the same as those ordered by the Florida Supreme Court, careful analysis
of this portion of the per curiam opinion could be crucial to ascertaining the meaning of
Bush v. Gore as applied to that case. My emphasis here, however, is not how Bush v.
Gore applies to judicially conducted recounts but whether it applies in other settings.
65 Sunstein sees the setting of a judicially conducted recount not as part of the major
premise in the decision but as a more or less arbitrary, though prudent, exercise of
caution. See Sunstein, supra note 33, at 123-128. Like the Janus interpreters, he treats the
insistence on the judicially conducted recount as limiting language, but unlike them, he
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Nevertheless, if my methodological premise is accepted, that the proper
way to interpret a judicial opinion is not to consider statements from the
opinion in isolation but to examine the opinion as a whole in order to discern
the reasoning that led to the result, Bush v. Gore is not a particularly difficult
case to interpret. The broad principles regarding the right to vote stated
earlier in the opinion are not inconsistent with or in tension with the
definition of the controversy as one arising in the setting of a judicially
conducted recount. To the contrary, these elements are both essential to the
holding, which is not that all disparate treatment of identical evidence in a
single judicial proceeding violates the Equal Protection Clause and is not that
all disparities in "election processes generally" violate the Equal Protection
Clause, but that in a single judicial proceeding, disparate treatment of votes
cast in a public election (presumptively) violates the Equal Protection Clause.
IV. TOWARD AN IMPROVED TAXONOMY
It may seem to follow from Part III that no taxonomy of possible
applications is needed other than a sorting out of questions that could arise in
challenges to judicially conducted recounts. 66 That would be an erroneous
conclusion, because it would overlook the possible influence of a precedent
on cases that it does not control. Although there is not a sharp dividing line,
lawyers routinely discuss whether a case is controlled by or "on all fours"
with a precedent, without implying that when it is not, the precedent is
necessarily irrelevant. Part III of this Article has attempted to demonstrate
that Bush v. Gore is a controlling precedent for cases-and only for cases-
defends the Court's use of that language. Id. at 127-28. He nevertheless finds the
decision deficient, primarily because on his assumption that the major premise consists
solely of the equal chance to have one's vote counted, the Court should have recognized
that the inequalities from having no manual recount at all exceeded those from the
difficulties with the recount as ordered by the Florida Supreme Court. Id. The Supreme
Court's decision cutting off the recount is thus likely to have aggravated the inequalities
and therefore is unjustifiable on the Court's own major premise---or "fundamental
motivation," in his terminology. Id. at 129. (His use of the term "fundamental
motivation" appears at 123.)
I operate in this Part on the assumption that a reading of a judicial opinion that
makes it coherent, persuasive, and consistent is preferable to one that makes it incoherent,
unpersuasive, and inconsistent. Sunstein's assumption that Bush v. Gore's major premise
is solely that the equal chance to have one's vote counted should be protected leads him
to find the decision deficient in all these ways. My contrary reading that the Court's
major premise includes the additional element of a judicially conducted recount renders
the decision coherent, persuasive, and consistent. This difference is, in my opinion, a
sufficient reason to prefer my reading over Sunstein's.
66 As was explained in note 64, supra, I do not attempt in this Article to sort out
such possibilities.
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in which identical evidence is assessed inconsistently in a judicially
conducted recount of a public election. 67 That does not eliminate the
possibility that Bush v. Gore could have an analogical influence on additional
cases. A proper assessment of Bush v. Gore's analogical force depends, no
less than assessment of its controlling force, on a correct understanding of its
holding. The purpose of this Part is to suggest the distinctions that are
relevant in light of the analysis in Part III.
The first distinction is suggested by the two aspects of the setting of Bush
v. Gore that the analysis has shown to be crucial: that identical evidence was
being assessed inconsistently within a single judicial proceeding and that the
inconsistent treatment implicated the right to vote. There could be analogical
but not controlling influence in future cases when one of these elements is
present but the other is not.
Bush v. Gore might therefore have analogical influence in a case not
involving a public election, in which a court assesses identical items of
evidence inconsistently. A possibility we have already considered is a
judicially conducted recount of a proxy contest in a corporate election. It
would be just as much of a denial of natural justice to treat identically
marked ballots differently in that setting as it was in Bush v. Gore. However,
as we have seen, when the assessment of the evidence does not implicate
voting in a public election, the constitutionally privileged status of the right
to vote does not come into play. The Supreme Court is no doubt reluctant to
constitutionalize aspects of state judicial proceedings that do not implicate
"fundamental" constitutional rights. Therefore, such a case would be one in
which Bush v. Gore would, by analogy, provide some impetus to the party
challenging the inconsistent treatment of identical evidence, but not one in
which that impetus would be controlling.
For purposes of this Symposium we are more interested in the other
category, in which treatment of votes or voters is at stake, but not in the
setting of a judicial proceeding. The next distinction that suggests itself is
between cases that do or do not involve assessment of identical items of
evidence. The evidence may consist of ballots themselves being counted or
recounted, as in the Florida controversy. Or it may consist of some of the
things Foley discusses, such as the form of identification a voter must show
at the polling place or in order to cast a provisional ballot, or the
computerized and original registration records maintained by a county. The
analogical force of Bush v. Gore will be stronger in challenges to
67 To say that a precedent is controlling for all future cases of a particular
description must always be subject to the implied qualification that the precedent is not
necessarily controlling in a future case that meets the description if there are also
additional salient circumstances that sufficiently change the aspect of the case.
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inconsistencies in the treatment of such items than when other sorts of
inconsistencies in election administration are challenged.
Another distinction is suggested by the phrase "a single state judicial
officer"68 in the concluding paragraph of Bush v. Gore. Outside the judicial
setting, election administration is partially centralized at the state level and
partially decentralized, typically at the county level. Bush v. Gore should
have a stronger analogical force in the case of an inconsistency in an activity
directly under the supervision of the state agency or occurring within a single
county than when the inconsistency arises between different counties in a
decentralized activity. There are pros and cons to decentralization of election
administration, but decentralization is an option available to the states and
accepting a degree of inconsistency is a necessary consequence of its
availability.
It appears, then, that a useful taxonomy of possible applications of Bush
v. Gore outside the judicial setting should include four categories defined by
the two distinctions just identified:
1. Identical items of evidence are treated inconsistently under the direct
supervision of a single state or county authority.
Examples would include a recount conducted by a county in which
different ballots are subjected to different standards for determining which
votes to count;69 a county checking for registration of some voters who seek
to cast provisional ballots only in the registration database but for others in
the original records; or a county instructing some precincts to require photo
identification but others to accept forms of identification without
photographs.
The analogical force of Bush v. Gore would be strong in a case of this
sort.70 The only salient difference is that between the judicial and
administrative settings. But administration is at its most "quasi-judicial"
when it makes judgments on treating identical items of evidence.
Considerations of decentralization do not come into play because the
category is limited to matters handled in a single agency.
68 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000)(emphasis added).
69 This was one of the things the Supreme Court found objectionable in the Florida
Supreme Court's incorporation into its own count of the recount conducted in Palm
Beach County. Id. at 106-07.
70 Statements of the analogical force of Bush v. Gore are subject to the same type of
qualification as was mentioned in note 67, supra.
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2. Identical items of evidence are treated differently by administrators
acting independently in different jurisdictions within a state.71
Many of the examples discussed by Foley come under this heading.
Consider, for example, L.a. above in the summary of Foley's taxonomy
presented in Part 11.72 The question of why the counties act differently from
one another-because they interpret state directives differently, or because
the state directives leave the matter up to the counties, or even because some
counties disobey the state directives-is irrelevant to the proposed taxonomy.
As we saw, Foley shows that there are two types of situation, either/or
differences (such as whether a county looks only at the database to find a
voter's registration or looks also at the original records) and differences of
judgment or degree (such as the degree of resemblance required between a
voter's signature on the provisional envelope and on the registration form).
The case for an Equal Protection violation is obviously stronger in the
either/or case, because some discrepancies are inevitable when judgment
must be applied.
Because of the quasi-judicial nature of the determinations that come
under this heading and the clear principle of natural justice that like cases
should be treated alike, the influence of Bush v. Gore in this situation should
be significant. 73 On the other hand, the recognition that decentralization is a
71 Virtually all commentary on Bush v. Gore assumes that its potential application is
to intrastate matters, because all elections in the United States are within a state or a part
of a state. One of the many drawbacks to schemes to terminate or undermine the electoral
college is that there would be inevitable pressure to expand the influence of Bush v. Gore
to interstate differences.
72 See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
73 In his response to this Article, Foley attributes to me the view that Bush v. Gore is
"applicable" to cases in this category. He quotes from the first sentence of my paragraph
in the text without mentioning the second sentence. Nor does he mention that in my
summary, contained in the last paragraph of this Part, I characterize the analogical force
of Bush v. Gore on cases in this category as "modest." See Edward B. Foley, Refining the
Bush v. Gore Taxonomy, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1035, 1038 (2007).
I shall confine my comments on Refining to this footnote, and begin by taking this
opportunity to acknowledge that I was overly hasty in grouping Foley with those I call
the Janus interpreters. I have perhaps been guilty of the same fault I impute to them-
relying on certain statements in isolation. More broadly, I am pleased to see that, as Foley
observes in Refining, there is considerable common ground between us.
The thrust of Foley's defense of his own position regarding the areas where we
disagree is to reaffirm the relevance for his taxonomy of considerations I have omitted, in
particular whether the disparity is caused by deliberate conduct, imprecise instructions, or
simple mistake. There probably is a substantive difference between us here. I am much
more inclined than Foley appears to be to leave managerial problems to management, and
I am skeptical that judicial intervention is likely to be a helpful influence. But our
difference in the present dialogue results at least as much from the different natures of
our projects as from our substantive differences. Although Foley does his best to tie the
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legitimate choice for the state to make and that with decentralization some
inconsistencies are inevitable puts a limit on how strong that influence should
be.
3. Discrepant treatment occurs under the direct supervision of a single
state or county authority, but not on a matter related to treatment of
evidence.
For example, the number of voting machines distributed to different
precincts will foreseeably result in much longer lines in some precincts than
in others. This is the reverse of the second category. Here, there is single
supervision and therefore no question of decentralization. In that sense, this
category is more like Bush v. Gore. But the questions that arise under this
category are more managerial and less quasi-judicial. The consequence of
extending Bush v. Gore to this category of cases is likely to be episodic
micromanagement of election administration by judges acting with little
guidance other than their own discretion. At best this is likely to be
disruptive and at worst it will be used for partisan purposes, either by the
lawyers who bring the cases or the judges. Though judges are unlikely
consciously to favor one party or candidate over the other in their
adjudication of cases, their perceptions of the discretionary factors that will
dominate the decision of such cases may well be influenced by their partisan
perspectives and associations.
4. Discrepant treatment occurs on a matter not related to the assessment
of identical items of evidence because of decisions made differently by
administrators acting independently in different jurisdictions within a state.
An example is an Equal Protection challenge to different kinds of voting
equipment being used in different counties, when one type results in more
criteria he regards as important to the per curiam opinion in Bush v. Gore, I find those
efforts unpersuasive. For the most part, Foley's central purpose is to sort out the cases in
general in accord with his predictions regarding their prospects for success. The meaning
of Bush v. Gore is important for that purpose, but many other things come into play, and
Foley wants to take those into account. In contrast, I have limited myself to attempting to
identify the present meaning of Bush v. Gore. The four categories I describe in this
section of the text are those that emerge from my reading of Bush v. Gore.
Foley presents a hypothetical which is factually identical to Bush v. Gore except that
the counties have promulgated and followed specific criteria for counting questionable
ballots, pursuant to statutory authority to do so. Could that affect the outcome, as Foley
suggests? Of course. Does the hypothetical then undermine my Part III account of the
holding? No. It is simply an example of what I said above, supra note 67 ("To say that a
precedent is controlling for all future cases of a particular description must always be
subject to the implied qualification that the precedent is not necessarily controlling in a
future case that meets the description if there are also additional salient circumstances
that sufficiently change the aspect of the case.").
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lost votes than the other. In cases coming under this category, the force of
Bush v. Gore is minimal because the points in issue are managerial rather
than quasi-judicial and because the discrepancy arises as a result of the
state's legitimate choice to decentralize. Neither of these important
considerations was a part of Bush v. Gore.
This is not to say that a plaintiff in a case coming under this heading
could not fairly cite Bush v. Gore for the general principles it sets forth
regarding the constitutional importance of the right to vote and of treating
each vote equally. But the plaintiffs ability to do so does not give Bush v.
Gore precedential force, because the same plaintiff could cite those same
general principles from Reynolds, Harper, and other cases even if Bush v.
Gore had never arisen. The doctrinal significance of Bush v. Gore was that it
applied those principles in a new setting. However, as the analysis has
shown, the new setting bears no relevant resemblance to cases coming within
the fourth category.
Like Foley, I have arranged my four categories in what I conceive to be
their order of strength. That the first category is the strongest and the fourth
the weakest is a direct consequence of my reading of Bush v. Gore and the
distinctions it invites. The logic of my analysis does not dictate the ranking
for the second and third categories. In my judgment, though both of the key
distinctions drawn in Bush v. Gore are important, the natural justice principle
of treating identical items of evidence alike is the more salient. I conclude
that the analogical force of Bush v. Gore is strong in the first category of
cases, modest in the second, weak in the third, and either nonexistent or
negligible in the fourth.
V. CONCLUSION
I want to reaffirm the intellectual debt I owe to Foley. Though I have
found it necessary to criticize his taxonomy in some respects and have
suggested a different approach to classifying actual and potential cases
arising under Bush v. Gore, I should not have been able even to attempt such
a project without the benefit of his achievement in assembling, sorting, and
clarifying the features of this confused landscape.
I have attempted to suggest a taxonomy that is clearer than Foley's and
more firmly rooted in a close reading of Bush v. Gore. The feature of my
Article that is likely to repel many lawyers and legal academics is its
insistence not only on a close reading but on a treatment of precedent that
may be characterized by some as formalism. However, a proper
understanding of how precedent operates and how the language of judicial
opinions differs from the language of statutes is essential to the craft of our
profession.
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Justice Scalia has famously (and controversially) written, in the context
of statutory interpretation, "[j]udges interpret laws rather than reconstruct
legislators' intentions. '74 Whatever one's views on statutory interpretation,
the parallel statement-those who apply judicial precedents apply their
holdings rather than reconstruct judges' intentions-ought to be
uncontroversial. Legislators are elected to exercise discretion in enacting
laws and may be held accountable by the public. Judges are selected to apply
the law and are held accountable by their sense of craft.75
The members of the Supreme Court in certain circumstances have the
responsibility to act consistently with high statesmanship while they exercise
their craft. In my personal opinion, the Court's statesmanship and craft in
Bush v. Gore left much to be desired. 76 However, the Equal Protection
analysis in the per curiam opinion has been unfairly disparaged. The result
accords with the natural justice principle. As is evidenced by the variety of
interpretations of the opinion, the Court could have made its reasoning more
easily discerned. But much of the confusion is the fault of the interpreters,
who pluck statements in isolation rather than considering the opinion as an
explanation of a decision. When one approaches the opinion in that latter
spirit, its meaning is not obscure. I have attempted to make this clear and to
suggest the implications of the decision, properly understood.
The Supreme Court may decide to extend Bush v. Gore in ways that no
one can foresee and that I have not attempted to predict. Or it may follow the
option, offered but not preferred by the Janus interpreters, to treat the
decision as if it had no precedential effect. Whatever the Court does, it will
do best if it has a clear-sighted idea of what Bush v. Gore actually held. In
the meantime, it is the duty of the lower courts to follow the holding until
and unless the Supreme Court charts a new course. This Article is written in
the hope it can help point the way of that duty.
74 INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452-453 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring).
75 See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (taking it for granted that the
"courts must declare the sense of the law" and that it would be an abuse for them to
"exercise WILL instead of JUDGMENT").
76 In particular, I believe the Constitution and statutes left the final decision of the
assessment of Florida's electoral votes up to Congress. I see no reason to doubt that
Congress was capable of carrying out that function in the event-which was not at all
inevitable-that allowing matters to run their course in Florida resulted in competing
electoral votes being cast and submitted. For other of my observations on Bush v. Gore,
see Lowenstein, supra note 5, at 21-22.
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